Rate Regulation by Government Competition by C., C. L.
Volume 45 Issue 3 Article 5 
April 1939 
Rate Regulation by Government Competition 
C. L. C. 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
C. L. C., Rate Regulation by Government Competition, 45 W. Va. L. Rev. (1939). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol45/iss3/5 
This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository 
@ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
West Virginia Law Quarterly
and The Bar
Published by the Faculty of the College of Law of West Virginia University,
and issued in December, February, April and June of each academic year. Offcial
publication of The West Virginia Bar Association.
Subscription price to individuals, not members of The West Virginia Bar As-
sociation, $2.00 per year. To those who are members of the Association the price
is $1.00 per year and is included in their annual dues. Single copies, 50 cents.
BOARD OF EDITORS






ALBERT FRANKLIN GOOD, Preside t
CLAUDE ELBERT GOODWIN, Secretary
JOHN CORNWELL AILES WILLIAm EDWARD NEELY
ANDREW LANE BLAIR JAMES POE ROBINSON
COURTENAY LOGAN CARROLL HIRAM G. WILLIAmSON
ROBERT BOOTH GOODWIN WILLIAM GUY WILSON
STUDENT NOTE
RATE REGULATION BY GOVERNIENT
COMPETITION
In the recent TVA case, the complainants were fourteen
(originally nineteen) privately owned public utility companies pro-
ducing, distributing and selling electric power in nine states.'
Respondent Tennessee Valley Authority, an agency of the federal
government, and its directors, under authority of an act of Con-
gres, 2 were producing and selling electric power in competition
with some of complainants, and contemplated competition with
others. Complainants filed a bill in equity seeking, broadly, to
enjoin production and sale of electric power by respondents, on
grounds that the act of Congress, purporting to authorize such pro-
duction and sale, and the activities of the TVA under the act, vio-
1 Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Georgia.
2 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended 48 STAT. 58 (1933),
49 STAT. 1075 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §§ 831 et seg. (1937), 16 U. S. C. A. §§ 831
et seg. (1938).
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lated the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments of the Federal
Constitution.3
The bill, in substance, alleged that complainants, lawfully en-
gaged in generating and selling electricity by authority of the laws
of the several states concerned, more than satisfied the needs of
their respective territories, and were ready and able to furnish addi-
tional facilities as needed; that their properties were modern, eco-
nomically operated, and of great value; that the rates charged by
each yielded no more than a reasonable return on the fair value of
the property used and useful in serving the public, and that these
concerns were fully regulated by the states. It was charged that
the TVA, from headquarters in Knoxville, Tennessee, carried on a
proprietary business of generating, transmitting and distributing
electric power in Tennessee, Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama; that
the act creating the Tennessee Valley Authority disclosed a purpose
to authorize a large and indeterminate number of water works in
order to create a vast supply of electric power, and to establish the
federal government in business, in competition with privately owned
utilities, without constitutional sanction ;4 that the underlying pur-
pose of the act, sought to be concealed behind provisions relating to
the war and commerce powers of Congress, was one of effecting a
federal control of intrastate electric rates and service through
"regulation by competition"; that the "yardstick" applied to
wholesale power rates was the wholesale price set by the TVA for
sale of power produced by it, while the retail "yardstick" was the
price at which TVA power was resold by municipalities to con-
sumers. It was alleged that, including the power dams already
constructed, eleven dams were to be completed by 1943, while it
was proposed to use every available site on the Tennessee River and
its tributaries; that, in an area of 40,000 square miles, there were
149 sites on which could be constructed dams capable of producing
25 billion kilowatt hours of electric energy annually, and that this
could be sold only by displacement of existing utilities, and that
3 Fifth Amendment, ". . nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. ..
Ninth Amendment, "The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Tenth Amendment, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people."
4 See the findings of Grubb, 5., in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
9 F. Supp. 965 (D. C. N. D. Ala. 1935), as to the purposes of the act and the
-power program.
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the program was intended to accomplish such displacement. It was
charged that respondents were attempting to disrupt business rela-
tions of existing utility companies by inducing municipalities,
through offers of federal grants, PWA loans, and cheap power, to
build their own distribution systems, and by procuring breach of
contracts, and by enticing away customers; that respondents had
lobbied through state legislatures bills authorizing their activities
in the states concerned; that TVA personnel had been installed in
the area to spread propaganda in favor of the government program
and to spread false and misleading rumors that complainants' rates
were unjustly high and unreasonable; that the Electric Home and
Farm Authority, cooperating with the TVA, was engaged in
financing sale of electric appliances, and circulated costly adver-
tising in praise of the TVA program; that complainants could not
complete with the noncompensatory "yardstick" prices, and were
therefore, facing loss of their properties, and destruction, at the
hands of an unauthorized government agency acting under color of
an unconstitutional law; that Congress was without constitutional
authority to so regulate the internal affairs of the states; that the
power program denied the constitutional rights of liberty to earn
a livelihood and acquire and use property subject only to state
regulation, and deprived complainants of their property without
due process of law.' In the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee, the bill was dismissed. That court held the
legislation and the production and sale of power under it constitu-
tional, and found that the unlawful practices alleged were not
proved. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States it
was held that complainants have suffered no injury which the law
recognizes, have not shown that they will suffer a legal wrong, and
therefore have no standing to complain.0 Two members of the
court, dissenting, thought complainants were entitled to have the
constitutional questions decided, since the bill asserted rights not
held and injuries not sustained in common with the general public,
sEven if the regulation were valid, Congress could not directly regulate in
such a manner as to deprive one of his property without due process of law.
a Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 59 S. Ct. 366,
83 L. Ed. 341 (1939). The opinion of the district court is found in 21 F.
Supp. 947 (D. C. E. Tenn. 1938). The fact that the three judge district court
found it necessary to decide the constitutional questions; that two members of
the Supreme Court considered it as necessary; and the length to which the
majority opinion goes to justify the position assumed, might indicate some
doubt as to that position. The dissenting opinion suggests that the majority
has undertaken to compress into a few narrow questions issues which can not
be so compressed, and to ignore other issues.
3
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and disclosed threatened direct, special and irreparable loss from
the acts of a government agency claimed to be acting without law-
ful authority.
Even prior to the decision in the principal case it was regarded
as probable that the court, though it strained a point in order to
consider the constitutional questions raised in the case of Ashwan-
der v. Tennessee Valley Authority,7 would avoid if possible the
constitutional issues here raised; but it was generally hoped, in
view of questions left open by the decision in the AsLwander case,
that the court might find it necessary to define with greater cer-
tainty the limits beyond which the federal government may not go
in regulation and control, by competition, of privately owned, in-
trastate business. That some limitations necessarily exist is plain,s
but what these may be is far from being so. The decision sheds
little light on that subject. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Roberts, and the minority opinion of Mir. Justice Butler, when read
together, convey a feeling that the court here strained a point to
avoid consideration of the constitutional questions presented. The
only guide remaining, aside from the Asiwander decision, is the
opinion of the district court, which, however, under the view taken
by the Supreme Court, was wholly unnecessary. As guides, in con-
sidering the present problem, neither the opinion of the distric;
court in the principal case, nor of the SIpreme Court in the Ash-
wander case, are satisfactory. It is not the purpose of this inquiry
to undertake to solve a problem which the Supreme Court seems
designedly to have avoided. But a solution, at some time, may
become necessary. The question will not be settled as an abstract
one separated from its natural setting. Not to solve, but to serve
to indicate the nature of the problem, and to suggest some of the
factors, legal and extra-legal, which are likely to have a bearing
upon the ultimate solution, it would be well to survey, briefly, the
background of the TVA.
The act creating the Tennessee Valley Authority purports to
intend, among other things, the improvement of certain waterways
for purposes of navigation, to provide for flood control, reforesta-
tion, the proper use of marginal lands, agriculture, the industrial
7 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466,
80 L. Ed. 688 (1936). Here it was held that stockholders of a power company
could complain where the company had entered into contracts, otherwise valid,
with an unconstitutional government agency.
8 If no limitations eisted, the government could at will convert its coal, oil,
and timber reserves into by-products and go into a great variety of businesses,
thereby controlling intrastate industry.
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development of the Tennessee valley, and to provide for the national
defense by creating a corporation to operate government proper-
ties." It authorizes the production of electric energy at hydro-
electric power dams, built and to be built, and the sale of such
electric power as is not required for government use, consistent,
however, with the use of the dams for purposes of flood control,
navigation, and national defense."0  As before indicated, this
statute was assailed as a sham and a pretense behind which the
federal government sought to conceal the real purposes of the Ten-
nessee Valley project, because the real purposes, it was claimed,
were without constitutional support. The district court, per Allen
J., unlike Grubb, J., in the case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority," declined to go beyond the act itself to determine the
purposes of the project. But no one, familiar with contemporary
history, could suppose that the act summarizes all the elements
which gave rise to the TVA.
Administrative tribunals, exercising legislative powers, 12 long
have been recognized as necessary to the effective functioning of
government. 13 Similar tribunals, performing judicial functions, 14
or exercising powers both legislative and judicial,' have become
necessary in order to take care of particular classes of interests
with which the courts, generally, are not adequately qualified to
deal, either because of the cumbersome procedure of the law courts,
causing expense and delay,'" or because expert attention is called
9 See the numerous sections of the act, cited by the district court in 21 F.
Supp. 958, 959.
10 See note 9, supra.
11See the district court's opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 9 F. Supp. 965 (D. C. . D. Ala. 1935).
12 Among these are the regulatory commissions, such as the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.
13 See Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 141 Pac. 1083,
Ann. Cas. 1916E 282 (1914); Trustee of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas,
etc. Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, 18 14. R. A. (x. s.) 713 (1908) ; Minne-
apolis, St. P. etc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com'n, 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 905,
17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 821 (1908). And see language in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935), and Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
14 The state workmen's compensation commissions, among others, exercise
functions essentially judicial.
1:5 The public service commissions act legislatively, and at the same time
may exercise powers similar to those exercised by courts.
16 See, for example, Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133,
51 S. Ct. 65, 75 L. Ed. 255 (1930), where the United States Supreme Court
remands for further proceedings, a suit begun in 1923.
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for by the particular subject matter involved." There is now in
progress a conflict between the courts and these tribunals, similar
to the conflict between the courts of law and courts of equity some
centuries ago. The judges of the law courts have had the last word
in litigation arising before administrative tribunals, and they have
been slow to accord finality even to administrative findings of
fact,18 and have been inclined to view, with some care, the activities
of the commissions, the organization of these bodies, and the quali-
fications of the members.19 The effect has beeni, that legislative
devices, designed to facilitate the settlement of cases in particular
fields, have often been of little avail.2 0 Where delay and expense
were sought to be avoided, reversals of commission orders, in the
courts, for what seem to be insufficient reasons, have continued to
cause expense and delay.2"
In the public utility field, where rate fixing is a troublesome
problem, the courts have insisted upon methods of valuation re-
garded by many as economically unsound,22 and undesirable; have
insisted upon, not only substantive due process, but "procedural
17 The necessity of expert attention is recognized in Interstate Commerce
Com'n v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 451, 32 S. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed.
308 (1912). And see New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345,
38 S. Ct. 122, 62 L. Ed. 337 (1917).
is See Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527,
64 L. Ed. 908, P. U. R. 1920E 814 (1920).
10 Compare, generally, the finality given to fact findings of the Interstate
Commerce Commission with that given to findings of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, as in Federal Trade Com'n v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 50 S. Ct. 1, 74
L. Ed. 138 (1929), and United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.,
235 U. S. 314, 35 S. Ct. 113, 59 L. Ed. 245 (1914).
20 The case of Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40
S. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (1920), is indicative of the results where attempts
have been made to make findings of fact conclusive. But see United Gas Co. v.
Texas, 303 U. S. 123, 58 S. Ct. 483, 82 L. Ed. 702 (1938), and Washington,
V. & M. Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 57 S. Ct.
648, 81 L. Ed. 965 (1937), which would seem to disclose a present tendency in
the reverse direction.
21 Observe the treatment by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of
workmen's compensation cases, as in Demasters v. Compensation Com'r, 112
W. Va. 498, 165 S. E. 667 (1932); Scott v. Compensation Com'r, 112 W. Va.
608, 166 S. E. 274 (1932); Gable v. Compensation Com'r, 111 W. Va. 404,
162 S. E. 314 (1932); Sedinger v. Compensation Com'r, 109 W. Va. 51, 152
S. E. 857 (1930).
22 The value of a business, if value is income capitalized, depends upon the
rate of return; but commissions are required to arrive at value as a, basis for
determining the rate. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42
L. Ed. 819 (1898). And see, expanding the doctrine of the Smyth case, South-
western Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com'n, 262 U. S. 276, 43 S. Ct. 544,
67 L. Ed. 981 (1923). For a criticism of the doctrine of reasonable return on
"fair value", see the opinion, in the latter case, of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes.
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due process" as well; 23 have declared that, where confiscation is
claimed, there must be full opportunity for an independent judi-
cial determination of both the law and the facts.2 ' A depression,
perhaps unparalleled, has served to magnify the obstacles which the
courts have placed in the way of economic and governmental re-
form. It has emphasized the fact that the courts too often are
not competent to deal with special problems calling for considera-
tion by experts. As a consequence of this emphasis, perhaps, a host
of new administrative bodies has been added to the ever increasing
list.
It is generally felt that electric utility rates have been unfairly
high. The consumer is not on an equality with the utility in litiga-
tion to determine what these rates ought to be at any given time.
The holding company device has been improperly used, to conceal
overvaluation of property considered in rate base determination.20
In such determinations, methods of doubtful validity have been
insisted upon." Out of all these interacting factors, and others,
proceed the underlying purposes of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
If other satisfactory avenues of rate control were closed, the govern-
ment itself would enter the electric utility field, *force rates down
through government competition, and, by means of its own ex-
perience, create a "yardstick" for determining what electric utility
rates should be.27
This device was put into effect at a time when the long em-
braced economic ideal of free competition had given way to the
notion that regulated competition was economically and socially
more desirable. It thus added complication to an already compli-
cated economic scene. It might have been supposed, from the ten-
2 West v. C. & P. Telephone Co., 295 U. S. 662, 55 S. Ct. 894, 79 L. Ed.
1640 (1935). But see Railroad Com'n of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co., 58 S. Ct. 334, 82 L. Ed. 327 (1938).
24 Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64
L. Ed. 908 (1920).
25, The district court in Tennessee Electric Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
21 F. Supp. 947 (D. C. E. Tenn. 1938), at page 950, observes: "The com-
plainants are in general owned by holding companies."
26 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com 'n, 262 U. S. 276,
43 S. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981, 31 A. L. R. 807 (1923); Smyth v. Ames, 169
U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
27 See the opinions of the district court and circuit court of appeals in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, appearing respectively in 9 F. Supp.
965 (D. C. N. D. Ala. 1935), and 78 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). In tho
latter court, the finding of the district court that one purpose of the TVA was
to create a "yardstick" was not challenged, but no mention of "yardstick" is
to be found in the district court's opinion in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 21 F. Supp. 947.
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dency to restrict wasteful competition between privately owned
utility companies, 2 that the same limitations would apply to com-
petition between governmental agencies and private concerns. In
the long run, the consumer must pay for wasteful duplication, by
whatever agency it is brought about. Generally, it would seem more
desirable to limit such competition, unless utilities already in the
field can not be made to serve "adequately". 9  And even though
the states, and state agencies, since the states, broadly, possess all
the powers not prohibited by the Constitution, have been permitted
to engage in such competition with private utilities,0 it might have
been supposed that the federal government, being, generally, a
government of enumerated powers, would be more restricted than
the states, within its particular sphere, by the ideal of regulated
competition. But recent decisions have not tended toward this
restriction.31
In the principal case, the bill charged conspiracy, coercion,
fraud, and duress, to effect unlawful contracts for sale of TVA
power to the injury of complainants. To all these latter charges,
the district court had the same answer: Not proved. It conceded
only the claim of injury. These charges are not material to the
present inquiry. As to the constitutional questions raised, the dis-
trict court, in effect, disposed of them in the following manner:
The Constitution empowers Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce, 32 and this authority includes provision for navigation and
flood control. Congress likewise is authorized to provide for the
2 8 See Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co. v. State Road Com'n,
104 W. Va. 183, 139 S. E. 744 (1927).
29 Where existing utilities can not be required to give "adequate" service,
there would seem to be justification for allowing a competing utility to serve.
But so long as high rates may be reduced by proper action, it can not be said
that such rates render service so inadequate as to justify competition.
32 Whether it is desirable or not, the states undoubtedly have the power to
set up government agencies competing with privately owned utilities. But if a
municipality, in operating an electric plant or a water system, acts in its pro-
prietary capacity, it is arguable that it should not receive a treatment, where
the question of competition arises, different from that accorded to a private
enterprise. It likewise is arguable that the federal government occupies a
position not unlike that of the municipality, for, just as the city must look to
its charter for authority to operate a utility, so should the federal government
look to the Constitution.
31 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra n. 7. A situation
seems to exist in which competition between privately owned concerns is regu-
lated, but in which competition by governmental agencies with private concerns
is permitted. Cf. Monongahela West Penn P. S. Co. v. State Road Com'n,
104 W. Va. 183, 139 S. E. 744 (1927), and Be Village of Hustisford, 2 P. U.
R. (N. S.) 485 (Wis. 1934).
32, U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
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national defense, 33 and, further, to dispose of property belonging
to the United States.3 4 Wilson dam was constructed under the war
powers of Congress. 5 The court assumes that, under the decision in
the Aslhwander case, 36 the production, and sale of electric power at
Wilson dam, without further qualification, is within the constitu-
tional powers of Congress. The other dams above Wilson dam,
intended to maintain an even flow of water at the latter dam, are
so connected with the purposes for which is was constructed, that
the power to build and operate them can not successfully be ques-
tioned. And each of the dams, constructed or proposed, is a unit of
an "integrated multiple-purpose project" concerned primarily
with navigation, 37 flood control, and national defense. This being
so, the supposedly subordinate purpose of power development is so
connected as to be within the powers of Congress. But if the fact
that it is part of a "multiple-purpose project" is not enough to lend
it validity, nevertheless water power, the right to convert it into
electric energy, and the energy produced, constitute property of the
United States; therefore, under the constitutional provision author-
izing Congress to dispose of property of the United States," the
production and sale of electric energy in competition with private
industry, without limit, is lawful. The Ashwiander case30 is cited
as authority for this proposition. It may well be doubted that the
decision in that case justifies the district court's opinion here. The
latter opinion creates a feeling that the power of the federal govern-
ment, to not only dispose of its lawfully held property in the form
acquired, but to convert it into other forms, and in these forms to
sell it in competition with private business, is utterly without limit.
There is also to be found in the Supreme Court's opinion in the prin-
cipal case the statement that the sale of government property in
competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
The statement does not limit such sale to property lawfully ac-
quired.
Heretofore, it might have been supposed that the authority of
the federal government to dispose of power created at government
33 Tbi.
34 Id. at Art. IV, § 3.
35 Id. at Art. I, § 8. Wilson dam was the first of the dams to be constructed.
See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra n. 7.
36 Ibid.
37 Control of navigation is included, by implication, within the commerce
clause, U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § VIII.
38 Id. at Art. IV, § 3.
39 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra n. 7.
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dams extended only to such incidental surplus as might be available
over and above that amount of power required for government
purposes, after an effort, in good faith, to produce only a quantity
sufficient to care for present government needs, with a reasonable
margin for needs reasonably expected to arise.40 But under the
opinion of the district court in the principal case, any project may
be carried on which bears a substantial relation to some constitu-
tional exercise of power; and a purpose which, alone, could not be
lawfully pursued, becomes lawful when made part of a multiple-
purpose project, the other purposes of which are lawful. By this
device, the federal government would be enabled to exercise a direct
control, in this instance by competition, not only over interstate
business, but upon intrastate business as well.41 In so far as it
discusses the questions raised in the case, the opinion of the
Supreme Court seems to take the position that competition is wholly
a matter of legislative policy; that the states may permit it or pro-
hibit it; that as the states involved have authorized it, this com-
petition is lawful; that the franchises of appellants do not give them
a right to be free of competition; that if there is federal regulation, it
is but incidental to the competition; and that the record justifies
the findings of the district court that there was no coercion, duress,
fraud, malicious motive nor conspiracy. On the point of regulation
being only an incident of the competition, the Supreme Court
reasons that competition by a privately owned company, permitted
by the state, would constitute as much a regulation in the same
sense. The reasoning, however, seems to overlook the fact that the
state has constitutional power to so regulate, and that the very
question raised is whether the federal government has such power.
There are those who contend that government regulation of
business, generally, is desirable. With this broader issue, the present
discussion is not concerned. It has, however, long been recognized
that regulation by government agencies of some businesses is de-
sirable. It is generally felt that regulation of electric utility com-
panies, in the public interest, has not been as effective as it ought
40 See the opinion of Grubb, J., in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
9 F. Supp. 965.
41 The Constitution gives Congress authority to regulate commerce among
the states. But even if it could be said that this includes, by implication, the
power to regulate such commerce by government competition, there is no
authority conferred to regulate intrastate enterprise by this method, nor is
there any implied power to enter a purely local business. For a discussion of
this subject see Welch, Constitutionality of the Tennessee Yalley Project (1935)
23 GEo. L. J. 389.
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to be. If the feeling has any basis in fact, then the objects to be
attained by the TVA are socially and economically desirable, and
only the methods employed to attain these ends are of doubtful
validity. Some such feelings, or sentiments, may well have exerted
an influence, consciously or unconsciously, upon the Court in the
principal decision. Such sentiments and feelings can not be utterly
divorced from the mind. There is apparent in recent decisions a
tendency to draw away from some of the doctrines which have
blocked effective rate control.42 In a sense, the present decision is
not wholly inconsistent with these. Further, in a broad sense, the
necessity for a decision of the questions raised would seem to be
lessened, if only in degree, by the apparent intention of the adminis.
tration not to expand its power activities to any great extent, and
the seeming likelihood that appropriations for power development
will be restricted by Congress.
Limited to the power industry, where legitimate regulation is
conceded to be necessary, the government competition complained
of may be calculated to achieve a desirable result. But its effect
upon the interests concerned is less only in degree than if it were
unlimited. It runs counter, whether so limited or not, to a present
tendency favoring the doctrine of "state's rights". It conflicts as
well with an apparent trend away from excessive centralization of
powers, and clashes with the economic ideal of regulated competi-
tion. Too, the necessity for a "yardstick" and for rate control by
government competition will have disappeared if the courts con-
tinue to pursue a present policy of giving greater finality to find-
ings of administrative tribunals.43
C. L. C.
42 See Railroad Com'n of California v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U. S. 388,
58 S. Ct. 334, 82 L. Ed. 327 (1938); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,
292 U. S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658, 78 L. Ed. 1182 (1934). And see Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235, 51 S. Ct. 429, 75 L. Ed. 999 (1931).
43 See United Gas Co. v. Texas, 303 U. S. 123, 58 S. Ct. 483, 82 L. Ed. 702(1938), limiting the kind of review theretofore required in due process cases;
Railroad Com'n of California v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U. S. 388, 58 S. Ct.
334, 82 L. Ed. 327 (1938), substituting, in effect, the "prudent investment"
rate base for "fair value"; Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 57 S. Ct. 648, 81 L. Ed. 965 (1937),
indicating a rough trend toward giving greater finality to commission findings
of fact, though the commission concerned is new, comparatively untried, and
is a target for considerable open criticism.
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